Relations between Azerbaijan and Iran have returned to normal after a series of diplomatic crises and escalating military drills near the border over the past two years. Recent signs point to a high level of commitment to new rules of engagement, as the leaders of Baku and Tehran increasingly agree to embrace their differences while capitalizing on the strategic opportunities offered by regional partnerships. Azerbaijan may soon reopen its embassy in Tehran, which was closed after the January 2023 terrorist attack, after Iran agreed to take steps expected by Baku's president. In a meeting with Azerbaijan's Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdullahian on March 6, the two neighbors said they had opened a “new chapter” in their bilateral relations and there were many possibilities for cooperation.
Actions followed words. On March 15, Azerbaijan's Energy Minister Parviz Shabazov was in Tehran for talks on energy cooperation. Recently, the Iranian side announced that preparations are in the final stages for a project aimed at connecting and synchronizing the power grids of Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. This is part of a broader trilateral partnership on north-south connectivity that gained momentum after Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022. A new bridge and checkpoint was opened on the Azerbaijan-Iran border in December 2023 to expand transport capacity on this route.
In May 2023, Russia and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding for the completion of the Rasht-Astara railway, a major bottleneck in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which connects Russia and India via Azerbaijan and Iran. Although it is extremely unlikely that the railway line, which is not possible in the current situation due to sanctions on Russia and Iran, will not only strengthen the geo-economic importance of Azerbaijan for various power centers; It would give the country a strategic tool to curb Russian and Iranian assertiveness in the region.
To the surprise of many, the friendly relations between Azerbaijan and Iran are also manifested in the military and cultural spheres, the aspects of bilateral relations that have become the most secure in the past few years. On May 3, Azerbaijan's Deputy Defense Minister General Karam Mustafayev met with Iranian First Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Aziz Nasirzadeh in Tehran and discussed prospects for defense cooperation. What makes this visit so significant is its timing on the heels of the recent strike-for-strike clash between Israel and Iran, Azerbaijan's main strategic partners in the Middle East. Tensions between Iran and Israel have crossed a red line and Baku believes it is necessary to act in coordination with all concerned parties to prevent spillover to the South Caucasus. Tehran, seeking to avoid a full-scale war with Israel and the United States, is being evaluated for its response to the event, including its engagement with neighboring countries.
Iranian Culture Minister Mehdi Esmaili, who visited Azerbaijan on May 1 to attend the 6th World Forum for Intercultural Dialogue, spoke about the life of the 12th century poet Nizami Ganjavi, a topic that both countries have long cherished. announced the launch of a joint film project depicting A dispute between Azerbaijanis and Iranians who claim the poet as one of their own. Shifting the focus to a shared cultural past and featuring figures like Nizami as bridges between the two countries alleviates the identity dimension of the tensions between the states that reached their peak in the fall of 2021-2022. It might happen.
What makes the recent thaw in relations between Azerbaijan and Iran all the more significant is that they are taking shape against a backdrop of increasing uncertainty in the neighboring countries. The ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, Iran's indirect involvement in the war through proxies of the “Axis of Resistance”, and the shift of Israel's focus to its neighbourhood, have put Azerbaijan in a difficult situation. . The situation was further exacerbated by the April 1 Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Syria, which triggered an exchange of direct attacks between the two countries, creating a highly unpredictable environment for neighboring countries, including Azerbaijan. Although the normalization of diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Iran appears to have passed this stress test, evolving security dynamics in the South Caucasus and the Middle East have placed further strain on this process, and if not carefully handled, both sides could easily We could be back on a collision course.
Firstly, the issue of the Zangezur corridor, which Azerbaijan envisages seamless access to its enclave of Nakhchivan through southern Armenia and which Iran considers a red line in its relations with Azerbaijan, will soon be brought to Armenia. – There is a possibility that it will resurface in the Azerbaijan negotiations. Following the recent bilateral agreement on the return of four villages on the border to Azerbaijan and the start of the delimitation process, the trilateral agreement of November 10, 2020 that Baku will now offer Yerevan a corridor to Nakhchivan This could put pressure on China to fulfill its commitments under the ceasefire statement. In late 2023, Azerbaijan reformulated its proposal and chose the Kaliningrad model for the Zangezur Corridor to allay Armenian and Iranian concerns about the route's full extraterritoriality. Baku also agreed with Tehran to build an alternative to the Zangezur Corridor project, the so-called Araz Corridor, without completely abandoning the latter. As Russia's position in the South Caucasus in general and in Armenia in particular declines and the vacuum is increasingly filled by external powers, the Zangezur Corridor will become further securitized and come under serious pressure by Armenia and Azerbaijan on the one hand, and by interested parties on the other. It will be. Regarding the relationship between Azerbaijan and Iran.
Second, even if a new balance of power, or what some experts call a balance of threat, emerges between Iran and Israel after the mutual attacks in April, the two countries' adversaries are now , operating within an entirely new power reality with greater room for miscalculation. With recent attacks on Israeli and US forces by the Iran-backed Axis of Resistance, the war appears to be returning to the shadows. But the red line has already been crossed, and the continuing arms race to maintain balance could create a situation prone to escalation. This strategic uncertainty puts further pressure on relations between Azerbaijan and Iran, which are on opposite sides of the regional alliance.
Unpredictability arising from Iran's increasingly militarized foreign policy has also affected relations between Azerbaijan and Iran, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs removed from important decision-making or relegated to the position of spokesperson for the Revolutionary Guards. This poses a serious obstacle to consolidating the “new normal” in China. After Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced a new agreement with Azerbaijan, Ambassador to Armenia Mehdi Sobani, a former ambassador to Syria and member of the Revolutionary Guard Quds Force, has already appeared on various occasions to disrupt the process on social media. stay up.
After these ups and downs, relations between Azerbaijan and Iran have returned to normal. However, it is one thing to put regional competition on a realistic track in a turbulent region, and it is another thing entirely to maintain its durability over the long term.
Source: Mahamad Mammadov Photo: The iconic Khudaferin Bridge connecting Iran and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani side has been occupied by Armenian forces for decades.
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