The Islamic Republic of Iran will hold special elections on Friday to choose a new president following last month's helicopter crash that killed incumbent President Ebrahim Raisi and several other top officials.
Four approved candidates remain in the race, with three likely to break through: Massoud Pezeshkian, a former health minister who is trying to rekindle hope that institutional reform is possible for millions of Iranians; Saeed Jalili, an ultra-hardliner who was Iran's lead nuclear negotiator more than a decade ago and who continues to adhere to the same principles of resisting outside pressure and influence; and Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf, the current speaker of parliament and former mayor of Tehran, known as a power-hungry, pragmatic technocrat who has also been implicated in corruption scandals.
Elections under the regime as entrenched in Tehran will not be free or fair, but the vote is important. It will have an impact on the long-term survival of the Islamic Republic at a time of deep domestic and regional turmoil. Today's clerical system is facing widespread discontent among the population, in part due to a worsening economy. The clerical system has further fueled the fire with its violent and repressive response to those who challenge it.
If a majority of Iranians do not vote, then those who advocate the country's most closed-minded and regressive tendencies will continue to rule unabated — but they will do so without even a pretense of national legitimacy. But if large numbers of people turn out to vote, the story becomes more complicated.
Although presidential elections are meticulously planned, they have historically been the only opportunity for Iranians to influence the government's decision-making. As a result, Iranian elections have often produced unexpected results.
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And in Iran's presidential elections, Iranians voted in large numbers for a so-called reformist candidate who advocated opening up to foreign investment, better relations with the world, and loosening social restrictions. It is important to remember that reformers are not trying to overthrow the Islamic Republic; through reforms they are trying to prolong its existence.
In 2013, for example, many observers were sure that hard-line Iranian President Jalili would win. He ran again and was the supreme leader's choice to succeed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But many, whose living standards had plummeted since U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil exports were imposed in 2012, were not so sure. Many vowed never to vote again, but as the election drew near, they supported cleric Hassan Rouhani, who promised engagement with the West as a way to lift sanctions that had crippled the Iranian economy. Rouhani's campaign made good use of social media, and many of his proposed cabinet members were Western-educated. Rouhani's momentum grew rapidly.
Rouhani won a surprising but overwhelming victory, receiving the majority of votes among six candidates. Jalili came in third in that election. Qalibaf, another candidate this year, finished second in 2013.
Will history repeat itself for Reformed Pezeshkian?
A lot has changed in the decade since then, but living standards are worse than they were then. Pezeshkian has promised new ties with the West and relaxed social restrictions. He has particularly questioned the wisdom of strict enforcement of the hijab requirement for women. It is unclear how he will achieve these goals. But former President Mohammed Khatami supports him, and Rouhani's foreign minister, Mohammed Javad Zarif, who was educated in the United States, is advising his campaign.
In response to pressure from the United States and other outside powers, Jalili has argued for retrenchment. While some of the regime's security elite may welcome that, ordinary Iranians have repeatedly rejected his isolationist views. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which he could win a majority of votes in either the three-way race or the runoff election. While his supporters may welcome his presidency for ideological reasons, his victory would signal that the Iranian people have given up on him.
Qalibaf, who headed the crackdown on protesters as Iran's police chief but was also a popular, nationally known mayor, has offered a centrist vision of improving people's quality of life through economic development while maintaining tight authoritarian control over society, with negotiations with the West as a necessary evil to achieve that goal.
So, most likely, this will be a fight between Pezechkian and Qalibakh. The establishment would prefer a high turnout in terms of legitimacy and a runoff between the two. After all, neither of them is a mortal threat, so it doesn't matter who wins. And paradoxically, if the hardliner wins, it would signal that the regime is probably at its lowest point in history.
